Multi-Unit Bayesian Auction with Demand or Budget Constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multi-Unit Bayesian Auction with Demand or Budget Constraints
In this work, we study multiple item auctions in a setting where items are distinguished by their relative values; any pair of items have the same ratio of values to all buyers. Buyers have additive valuations for multiple items. The application we have in mind is that items are positions in an ad auction, and an item’s value corresponds to its click-through rate. Buyers have various per-click ...
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Motivated by sponsored search auctions, we study multi-unit auctions with budget constraints. In the mechanism we propose, Sort-Cut, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since Sort-Cuts revenue is increasing in budgets and values, all kinds of equilibrium deviations from true valuations turn out to be bene cial to the auctioneer. We show that the revenue of Sort-Cut can be an or...
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We study multi unit auctions in presence of budget constraints. This situation is very common in real world but has not received proper attention in theoretical literature. We will study the impact of budget on the different aspects of multi unit auctions. These results try to define a frame work in which multi unit auctions with budget constraints are working and problem we are facing in desig...
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We show that the the unit demand auction introduced by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor [5] is incentive compatible even when bidders have budget constraints. Furthermore we show that myopic bidding is an ex post equilibrium. Finally, we show that any other incentive compatible which always outputs a competitive equilibrium (envy free) must coincide with the DGS auction.
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We consider an economy with one seller and m selfish buyers. The seller has n indivisible heterogeneous items to sell and each buyer wants at most one of those items. Buyers have private, independent and known value on the items. We propose an exact Vickrey-Dutch auction, where prices of appropriate items are decreased by unity in each iteration. This auction converges to Vickrey payoff point e...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Computational Intelligence
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0824-7935
DOI: 10.1111/coin.12056