Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
We provide an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes Ausubel’s (2004) and yields the same outcome as Perry and Reny’s (2002) generalization of Vickrey’s (1961) sealed-bid auction. There are two key features of our auction...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.556242