Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to design modern computer (collaborative filtering, dynamic Q&A platforms, diversifying search results). All these share problem identifying subset alternatives -- and study multi-winner principled analysis this task. This book provides thorough in-depth look at approval One speaks preferences if voters express their by providing they approve. Approval thus separate approved disapproved ones, simple, binary classification. The corresponding rules are called approval-based committee (ABC) rules. Due simplicity preferences, ABC widely suitable for practical use. Recent years have seen rising interest voting. While has been originally topic studied economists political scientists, significant recent progress occurred field computational social choice. discipline situated intersection artificial intelligence, science, economics, (to lesser degree) combining insights methods distinct fields. goal present fundamental concepts results discuss advances main focus axiomatic analysis, algorithmic results, relevant applications.
منابع مشابه
Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SpringerBriefs in intelligent systems
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['2196-5498', '2196-548X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09016-5