Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates
It is known that multidimensional Downsian competition fails to admit an equilibrium in pure strategies unless very stringent conditions on the distribution of voters’bliss points are imposed (Plott 1967). This paper revisits this problem considering that the two vote share maximizing candidates are differentiated. That is, candidates strategically decide positions only in some of the n dimensi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.005