Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions
Maskin and Riley (Games Econ Behav 45:395–409, 2003) and Lebrun (Games Econ Behav 55:131–151, 2006) prove that the Bayes–Nash equilibrium of first-price auctions is unique. This uniqueness requires the assumption that a buyer never bids above his value (which amounts to the elimination of weakly dominated strategies). We demonstrate that, in asymmetric first-price auctions (with or without a mi...
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The paper reports on the effects of one-sided imperfect information on bidding behaviour in simultaneous and sequential first-price auctions of non-identical objects when bidders have multi-unit demands. The analysis provides the following four main results. First, when different objects are to be sold in sequence, the seller maximises her expected revenues by selling the most valuable object f...
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We propose a new approach to asymmetric rst price auctions which circumvents having to directly examine bidding strategies. Speci cally, the ratio of bidderspayo¤s is compared to the ratio of the distribution functions that describe beliefs. This comparison allows a number of easy inferences. In the existing theoretical literature, assumptions of rst order stochastic dominance or stronger im...
متن کاملNumerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
Article history: Received 1 November 2009 Available online 3 March 2011 JEL classification: D44 C63 C72 D82
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We use perturbation analysis to obtain explicit approximations of the equilibrium bids in asymmetric first-price auctions with n bidders, in which bidders’ valuations are independently drawn from different distribution functions. Several applications are presented: explicit approximations of the seller’s expected revenue, the maximal bid, the optimal reserve price, inefficiency, and a consequen...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory Bulletin
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2196-1085,2196-1093
DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0049-1