Multiple equilibria model with intrafirm bargaining and matching frictions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Efficiency of Training and Hiring with Intrafirm Bargaining
In a matching and intra rm bargaining economy with constant return to scale production and matching technologies, large rms hire and train workers e¢ciently. The e¢ciency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large rm to take into account the consequences of training on the wages bargained inside the rm. This intra rm bargaining process solves the hold-up problem that is associ...
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Suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good. Sellers post prices, and then buyers choose sellers. In symmetric equilibrium, similar sellers all post one price, and buyers randomize. Hence, more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate. We call this frictions. We solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n an...
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Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) show that a simple homogeneous market with exogenous matching has a continuum of (non-competitive) perfect equilibria; however, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium is competitive. By contrast, in the more general case of heterogeneous markets, we show there exists a continuum of (non-competitive) Markov perfect equilibria. However, a refinement of the Markov pro...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Labour Economics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0927-5371
DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2010.04.010