Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle

نویسندگان

چکیده

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Multiple Public Goods: the Replacement Principle and the Lexmax Extension

This paper studies the problem of providing multiple public goods for agents with single-peaked preferences. A decision rule selects m points for the m identical public goods for every pro le of reported preferences. In Miyagawa (1998c) these multiple public goods are options, i.e., alternatives are compared by the most preferred goods according to the agents' preferences. In this paper agents ...

متن کامل

Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences

We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of strategy-proofness (incentive compatibility). In addition (and even when extended to the case of Leontief bundles) it enjoys Pareto efficiency, envy-freeness, and time efficiency. 1998 ACM Subject Classification F...

متن کامل

The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks

We study the problem of providing two public goods on tree networks, in which each agent has a single-peaked preference. We show that if the number of agents is at least four, then there exists no social choice rule that satisfies efficiency and replacement– domination. In fact, it is shown that these two properties are incompatible even if agents’ preferences are restricted to a smaller domain...

متن کامل

A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange with Multiple Indivisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences

Core-selection is a crucial property of social choice functions, or rules, in social choice literature. It is also desirable to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences. This paper investigates an exchange problem where each agent may have multiple indivisible goods, agents’ preferences over sets of goods are assumed to be lexicographic, and side payments are n...

متن کامل

Public Goods Agreements with Other‐regarding Preferences

Stimulation of cooperation when noncooperation appears to be individually rational has been an issue in economics for at least a half century. In the 1960's and 1970's the context was cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game; in the 1980's voluntary provision of public goods; in the 1990's, the literature on coalition formation for public goods provision emerged, in the context of coalitions ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics

سال: 2002

ISSN: 0304-4068

DOI: 10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00002-2