Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentive Efficient Market Design∗
I study an environment with many competing uninformed sellers, one informed buyer, common values and exclusive contracts. I build on the seminal contributions of Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976), Myerson (1983) and Maskin-Tirole (1992) to construct a novel market mechanism, that combines signaling and screening features, and implements interim incentive efficient allocations as equilibria. In the mar...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Design
سال: 2001
ISSN: 1434-4742
DOI: 10.1007/pl00013693