Mutual fund performance: banking versus independent managers

Do Mutual Fund Managers Monitor Executive Compensation?

We find significant relations between active mutual fund portfolio holdings and executive compensation, which appear to be largely driven by mutual fund investment styles rather than monitoring behaviour. Aggressive growth fund holdings are associated with performance pay, while income fund holdings are negatively related. We also find that mutual fund holdings are insensitive to changes in exe...

Evaluating Mutual Fund Performance

We study standard mutual fund performance measures, using simulated funds whose characteristics mimic actual funds. We find that performance measures used in previous mutual fund research have little ability to detect economically large magnitudes ~e.g., three percent per year! of abnormal fund performance, particularly if a fund’s style characteristics differ from those of the value-weighted m...

Managers, Investors, and Crises: Mutual Fund Strategies in Emerging Markets

Front - Running by Mutual Fund Managers : A Mixed Bag ?

This paper evaluates the welfare implications of front-running by mutual fund managers. It extends the model of Kyle (1985) to a situation in which the insider with fundamentals-information competes against an insider with trade-information and in which noise trading is endogenized. Noise traders are small investors trading through mutual funds to hedge non-tradable or illiquid assets. The insi...

Predation versus Cooperation in Mutual Fund Families

In this paper we investigate how mutual funds react to the distress of another fund in the same fund family. We test three alternative hypotheses: (1) funds help the distressed fund, (2) funds front-run the distressed fund improving their relative performance in the fund family and, (3) the family coordinates and benefits from front-running the distressed fund. Our results suggest that fund man...