n-DISTRIBUTIVE NEARLATTICES

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: JOURNAL OF MECHANICS OF CONTINUA AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES

سال: 2020

ISSN: 0973-8975,2454-7190

DOI: 10.26782/jmcms.2020.05.00007