N-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solutions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Properly Efficient Bargaining Solutions
This note is motivated by the similarity between multiobjective programming (MOP) and bargaining theory. It uses the known MOP concepts to establish two new bargaining results: (1) the efficiency of KalaiSmorodinsky (KS) and Nash (NA) solutions for large classes of bargaining problems can be refined to the sharper concept of proper efficiency; (2) the independence of irrelevant alternatives (II...
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This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Our characterizing axioms are various extensions of Nash’s original axioms. ∗ We are grateful to the referee and t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1680365