Naive learning and cooperation in network experiments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Naive learning and cooperation in network experiments
In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners’ dilemmas experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different size and structure, we observe choices under different information conditions, and we estimate parameters of a learning model. We find that naive imitation, although a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, may be negligible in the experimen...
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In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners’ dilemmas experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different size and structure, we observe choices under different information conditions, and we estimate parameters of a learning model. We test robustness of the estimator. We find that naive imitation, although a driving force in many models of spatial evolutio...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.002