NASDAL: Prices hold up

نویسندگان

چکیده

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Caps hold line on knee prices.

When materials managers try to shave costs off of the supply chain, pricing receives the most attention. However, those who also tackle the distribution system and embark on the difficult task of logistics planning could cut an additional 15% from the costs of bringing supplies from manufacturers to end users, industry studies indicate. No one says the task is easy, least of all Larry Dooley, l...

متن کامل

Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties

This paper studies royalty negotiations between a patent holder and a downstream firm selling a product which is more valuable if it includes a feature covered by the patent. Royalties are negotiated in the shadow of patent litigation, which will determine whether or not the patent is valid and infringed. If the two firms negotiate after the downstream firm has already designed its product to i...

متن کامل

Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up∗

We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast to fundamental assumptions of hold-up models. We develop a model in which relational contracts are repeatedl...

متن کامل

Is There a Hold–up Problem?

Most literature on the hold–up problem assumes that ex post bargaining outcomes are insensitive to prior investment costs. However, many bargaining procedures admit multiple equilibria and hence allow investment costs to affect bargaining outcomes. On the other hand, multiplicity of equilibria leaves scope for coordination failure. We report on three experiments in which unilateral investment i...

متن کامل

Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

The paper examines the theoretical foundations of the hold–up problem. At a first stage, one agent decides on the level of a relationship– specific investment. There is no contract, so at a second stage the agent must bargain with a trading partner over the surplus that the investment has generated. We show that the conventional underinvestment result hinges crucially both on the assumed bargai...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: BDJ in practice

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['2057-3308', '2520-8675']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41404-020-0637-8