Nash Equilibria for a Quadratic Voting Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nash Equilibria for a Quadratic Voting Game
N individuals must choose between two collective alternatives. Under Quadratic Voting (QV), individuals buy vote in favor of their preferred alternative from a clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased, and the sum of all votes purchased determines the outcome. Heuristic arguments and experimental results have suggested that this simple, detail-free mechanism is utilita...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2488763