Nash Equilibrium Solution In Trapezoidal Fuzzy Environment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IOSR Journal of Engineering
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2278-8719,2250-3021
DOI: 10.9790/3021-03120714