Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences
In this paper, we study the Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. We show that, with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We examine the implementability of various social choice correspondences (SCCs) in this environment, and prove that some well-known SCCs are Maskin monotonic ( but they do not satisf...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2073-4336
DOI: 10.3390/g4010038