Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori

Naturalism and the a Priori

In Coming to Our Senses (1996), I argue for and apply a naturalistic semantic methodology to defend an anti-holistic truth-referential view of meaning. The naturalism in question is an epistemological doctrine that I take from Quine: there is only one way of knowing, the empirical way that is the basis of science (whatever that way may be). So I reject “a priori knowledge.” I do not give a deta...

5 Naturalism and the A Priori Penelope Maddy

place this naturalism in what I hope to be an illuminating historical context, to trace the status of the a priori through its various twists and turns, and eventually to draw some tentative conclusions about the naturalistic status of the a priori. To do this, I first return to Kant. While it's surely no surprise that an examination of the a priori should start from Kant, perhaps his relevance...

Fallibilism and concessive knowledge attributions

Lewis concludes that fallibilism is uncomfortable, though preferable to scepticism. However, he believes that contextualism about knowledge allows us to ‘dodge the choice’ between fallibilism and scepticism. For the contextualist semantics for ‘know’ can explain the oddity of fallibilism, without landing us into scepticism. The challenge facing the non-contextualist advocate of fallibilism is t...

the investigation of the relationship between type a and type b personalities and quality of translation

چکیده ندارد.

Positivism, Naturalism, and Anti- Naturalism in the Social Sciences