Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters
This work studies a two-candidate single-dimensional Downsian voting model with variable voter turnout. I consider a one-shot game between two candidates, where the payoffs of the candidates are their vote shares, and the strategy set of each candidate is a one-dimensional set of policy positions. The utility that a voter attributes to a candidate is linear in both the absolute distance between...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Economic Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0013-0133,1468-0297
DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaa037