Neighborhood Diversity Promotes Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Social diversity promotes cooperation in spatial multigames
Social diversity is omnipresent in the modern world. Here we introduce this diversity into spatial multigames and study its impact on the evolution of cooperation. Multigames are characterized by two or more different social dilemmas being contested among players in the population. When a fraction of players plays the prisoner’s dilemma game while the remainder plays the snowdrift game cooperat...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Access
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2169-3536
DOI: 10.1109/access.2017.2776966