Network Investment under Legal and Ownership Unbundling
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Network investment under legal and ownership unbundling1
We consider an industry where an upstream rm determines the size of a network used by two downstream rms. We contrast ownership unbundling and legal unbundling, where the upstream rm maximizes its total pro t, including the pro t of its downstream subsidiary(ies), but does not discriminate between them. Furthermore, each downstream subsidiary maximizes its own pro t. We show that ownership s...
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Treating control as an asset that can be bought and sold, we introduce a model of the simultaneous and separable trading of ownership and control in a private information setting. The model provides a novel explanation for the prevalence and persistence of the separation of ownership from control in modern corporations: efficiency in the market for corporate control is more easily achieved when...
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This paper examines how foreign ownership affects the investment decisions of subsidiary firms using a new dataset of listed-parent − listed-subsidiary pairs. We find that improvements in the investment opportunities of parent firms have a negative effect on the investment of their subsidiaries, after controlling for the investment opportunities of the subsidiary, which can be independently obs...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Network Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1446-9022,2194-5993
DOI: 10.1515/rne-2012-0012