Network public goods with asymmetric information about cooperation preferences and network degree
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Networks
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0378-8733
DOI: 10.1016/j.socnet.2013.08.005