New Hampshire Effect: behavior in sequential and simultaneous multi-battle contests
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests
In a dynamic contest where it is costly to compete, a player who is behind must decide whether to surrender or to keep fighting in the face of bleak odds. We experimentally examine the game theoretic prediction of last stand behavior in a multi-battle contest with a winning prize and losing penalty, as well as the contrasting prediction of surrendering in the corresponding contest with no penal...
متن کاملMulti-battle contests
We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium analytically and demonstrate that it ex...
متن کاملAn Experimental Investigation of Simultaneous Multi-battle Contests with Complementarities
This paper reports the results of laboratory experiments that are designed to test theoretical predictions in a multi-battle contest with complementarities. The specific setting is a game of Hex where control of each region is determined by a Tullock contest and the overall winner is determined by the combination of claimed regions. We find that in a game with only a few regions, aggregate beha...
متن کاملBudget-constrained multi-battle contests: A new perspective and analysis
In a multi-battle contest, each time a player competes by investing some of her budgets or resources in a component battle to collect a value if winning the battle. There are multiple battles to fight, and the budgets get consumed over time. The final winner in the overall contest is the one who first reaches some amount of total value. Examples include R & D races, sports competition, election...
متن کاملWhy Does New Hampshire Matter – Simultaneous v.s. Sequential Election with Multiple Candidates
I study and compare preference aggregation in a simultaneous and a sequential multicandidate election. Voters have perfect information about their own preference but do not know the median voter’s preference. A voter has an incentive to vote for her second choice for fear that a tie between her second and third choice is more likely than she would like. Therefore, a voter may want to coordinate...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Experimental Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1386-4157,1573-6938
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9569-0