منابع مشابه
Inefficient rushes in auctions
We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second main result is that the second bes...
متن کاملGreed, Fear, and Rushes∗
We develop a continuum player unified timing game that also rationalizes sudden mass movements. Payoffs in the game are a logsubmodular function of time and the stopping quantile. Time captures the payoff-relevant fundamental — payoffs “ripen”, peak at a “harvest time”, and then “rot”. Capturing the strategic interaction, payoffs are single-peaked in the quantile. We distinguish between greed a...
متن کاملRushes Redundancy Detection
The rushes is a collection of raw material videos. Various video redundancies exist, such as rainbow screen, clipboard shot, white/back view, and unnecessary re-takes. This paper develops a set of solutions to identify and remove these video redundancies as well as create a summary video. We consider the manual editing effects, such as clipboard shots, as a differentiator in the visual language...
متن کاملRushes in Large Timing Games∗
We develop a tractable continuum player timing game that subsumes wars of attrition and pre-emption games, in which greed and fear relax the last and first mover advantages. Payoffs are continuous and single-peaked functions of the stopping time and quantile. Time captures the payoff-relevant fundamental, as payoffs “ripen”, peak at a “harvest time”, and then “rot”. Whenever payoffs are nonmono...
متن کاملIne � cient rushes in auctions ⇤
We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders and takeovers in which the ex post e cient allocation, i.e. the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e. all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its e ciency. Our second main result is that the second best can b...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/471015a