Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel
This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in apex games. Two di¤erent protocols are considered: the egalitarian propocol, which selects each player to be the proposer with the same probability, and the proportional protocol, which selects each player with a probability proportional to his number of votes. Expected equilibrium payo¤s coincide with the kernel for the gra...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00501-8