Non-Exclusive Competition Under Adverse Selection
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection
This paper studies how implicit collusion may take place through simple non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection when multiple buyers (e.g., entrepreneurs with risky projects) non-exclusively contract with multiple firms (e.g., banks). It shows that any price schedule can be supported as equilibrium terms of trade in the market if each firm’s expected profit is no less than its reserva...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1804849