Non-interactive Timestamping in the Bounded-Storage Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Passive Timestamping in the Bounded Storage Model Submission Version
A timestamping scheme is passive if a stamper can stamp a document without communicating with any other player. The only communication done is at validation time. Passive timestamping has many advantages, such as information theoretic privacy and enhanced robustness. Passive timestamping, however, is not possible against polynomial time adversaries that have unbounded storage at their disposal....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Cryptology
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0933-2790,1432-1378
DOI: 10.1007/s00145-008-9035-9