NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nonstationary Relational Contracts with Adverse Selection
We develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal wage dynamics. Workers are heterogeneous and each worker’s ability is both private information and fixed for all time. Learning therefore occurs within employment relationships. The inferences, however, are confounded by moral hazard: the distribution of output is determined by both the worker’s type and by his ...
متن کاملOnline Appendix to “Nonstationary Relational Contracts with Adverse Selection”
Lemma A1: If a contract {wt} is self-enforcing, then there is another self-enforcing contract {w′ t} such that: (i) w′ t is nondecreasing in t, (ii) the no-shirking conditions, Ut − U1 ≥ ĉ for all t ≥ 2, do not bind for any t ≥ 2, (iii) firms’expected (discounted) profits are the same under two contracts, V1 = V ′ 1 . Proof. The proof is by construction. We show it in several steps. Step (1) (c...
متن کاملNonstationary Relational Contracts
We develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal wage dynamics. Workers are heterogenous and each workers’ ability is both private information and fixed for all time. Learning therefore occurs within employment relationships. The inferences, however, are confounded by moral hazard: the distribution of output is determined by both the worker’s type and by his u...
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A significant and growing share of US agricultural output is produced under a production or marketing contract. An important controversy regarding agricultural production contracts is the control of non-labor inputs. Over time, contracts have tended to place more inputs under the buyer’s control and fewer under the farmer’s. This analysis examines the welfare effects of this trend. In the frame...
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This paper analyzes the interaction of fairness concerns and social comparisons with asymmetric information and incentives within the context of a firm’s employment decision. It studies optimal, incentive-compatible employment contracts if each worker is inequity averse he suffers from being ‘worse off’ than his colleagues and has private information about his productivity. Inequity aversion is...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0020-6598
DOI: 10.1111/iere.12005