NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games

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NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games

In this paper, we prove that both problems for calculating the Banzhaf power index and the Shapley-Shubik power index for weighted majority games are NP-complete.

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Efficient Computation of Power Indices for Weighted Majority Games

Power indices of weighted majority games are measures of the effects of parties on the voting in a council. Among the many kinds of power indices, Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and Deegan-Packel index have been studied well. For computing these power indices, dynamic programming algorithms had been proposed. The time complexities of these algorithms are O(nq), O(nq), and O(nq), respective...

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Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games

The Shapley-Shubik power index in a voting situation depends on the number of orderings in which each player is pivotal. The Banzhaf power index depends on the number of ways in which each voter can e¤ect a swing. If the input size of the problem is n, then the function which measures the worst case running time for computing these indices is in O (n2) : We present a method based on generating ...

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Power in Weighted Majority Games

This paper suggests an indicator of power in weighted majority games. An indicator of power determines the ability of a voter to influence the outcomes of the voting bodies he belongs to. In a weighted majority game each voter is assigned a certain nonnegative real number weight and there is a positive real number quota satisfying a boundedness condition such that a group of voters can pass a r...

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Easy weighted majority games

In a weighted majority game each player has a positive integer weight and there is a positive integer quota. A coalition of players is winning (losing) if the sum of the weights of its members exceeds (does not exceed) the quota. A player is pivotal for a coalition if her omission changes it from a winning to a losing one. Most game theoretic measures of the power of a player involve the comput...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Computer Science

سال: 2001

ISSN: 0304-3975

DOI: 10.1016/s0304-3975(00)00251-6