Nuclear Capacity Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Simulating Capacity Auctions With econport
A simulator environment to study and understand capacity auction has been developed based on the online web simulator econport. The goods to auction are unloading rights for ships that transport liquefied natural gas (LNG) into harbours. Experiments have been carried out at a company that will participate in the future capacity market. The efficiency of the auctions both for the auctioneer and ...
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Well-designed auctions work well for allocating idiosyncratic properties efficiently. If there is a sufficient number of non-colluding bidders, auctions can reveal the value of the property and maximise the revenue raised. Multiple round auctions can disseminate diffusely held information, though with additional risks of signalling and collusion. Auctions are perceived as more objective and fai...
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A simulation environment has been used to study the behaviour of buyers when participating in capacity auctions. Gender differences have been found among buyers, which are university students, according to auction types. Males are more active in auctioning, they are also willing to take more risks and therefore they get more products than they should, but paying more than females for them.
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Research on reverse auctions for procurement has traditionally ignored the temporal and finite capacity constraints under which manufacturers operate. We consider the problem faced by a manufacturer that procures multiple key components from a number of possible suppliers through multi-attribute reverse auctions. Bids submitted by prospective suppliers include a price and a delivery date. The m...
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This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm’s minimum acceptable price and the maximum qu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2094158