Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
January 2002 (First version: November 1998) Many strategic interactions in the real world take place among delegates empowered to act on behalf of others. Although there may be a multitude of reasons why delegation arises in reality, one intriguing possibility is that it yields a strategic advantage to the delegating party. In the case where only one party has the option to delegate, we analyze...
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In this paper, a principals decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It is found that the principal is less likely to delegate both tasks in a dynamic setting than in a stat...
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Article history: Received 6 February 2009 Received in revised form 10 August 2009 Accepted 9 September 2009 Available online 30 September 2009 JEL classification: D71 D72 F53 H11
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In this paper we introduce the concept of cooperative message handling, in which several objects act together in answering a message they have received jointly. Cooperative message handling extends the traditional message passing paradigm which requires the receiver of a message to be a single object only. Cooperative messages are deened with cooperation contracts which are established between ...
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We examine the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game experiment. We show that when the proposer uses a delegate, her share increases both when the delegate is optional or mandatory. This is true despite the fact that the delegate cannot be used as a commitment device. We also show that unobserved delegation by the responder reduces her share, as her delegate is perceived to...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 1991
ISSN: 0020-6598
DOI: 10.2307/2527106