OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY‐PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSIGNMENT RULES: A NEW CHARACTERIZATION
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract We consider assignment problems where individuals are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers not allowed. provide a characterization of rules that Pareto efficient, nonbossy, implementable in obviously strategy‐proof (OSP) mechanisms. As corollaries our result, we obtain OSP‐implementable fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules, hierarchical exchange rules. Troyan ( International Economic Review 60 (2019), 1249–61) provides FPTTC when there equal number objects. Our result generalizes this for arbitrary values those.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1468-2354', '0020-6598']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12538