Oligopolies with (Somewhat) Environmentally Conscious Consumers: Market Equilibrium and Regulatory Intervention
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multimarket Oligopolies with Restricted Market Access
We study the existence of Cournot equilibria in multimarket oligopolies under the additional restriction that every firm may sell its product only to a limited number of markets simultaneously. This situation naturally arises if market entry is subject to a valid license and each firm holds a fixed number of licenses only, or, equivalently, if the firms’ short-term assets only suffice to serve ...
متن کاملStrategic Interactions in Two-Sided Market Oligopolies
Strategic interactions between two-sided platforms depend not only on whether their decision variables are strategic complements or substitutes as for one-sided firms, but also -and crucially soon whether or not the platforms subsidize one side of the market in equilibrium. For example, with prices being strategic complements across platforms, we show that a cost-reducing investment by one firm...
متن کاملOn the Ramsey Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Consumers
In this paper we address the question of deterministic cycles in a Ramsey model with heterogeneous in nite-lived agents and borrowing constraints, augmented to take into account the case of elastic labor supply. Under usual restrictions, not only we show that the steady state is unique, but also we clarify its stability properties through a local analysis. We nd that, in many cases, the introdu...
متن کاملGeneral Equilibrium Tax Policy with Hyperbolic Consumers *
Recently David Laibson and others have argued in favor of using hyperbolic discount functions. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether conventional wisdom, based on the standard model with exponential discounting, also holds in the case where consumers have hyperbolic discount functions. In other words do hyperbolic preferences matter for practical policy evaluation? Within the fram...
متن کاملSimple Market Equilibria with Rationally Inattentive Consumers†
We study a market with rationally inattentive consumers who are unsure of the terms of the offers made by firms, but can acquire information about the terms at a cost. In a symmetric equilibrium, the price set by firms is continuously increasing in the cost of information for consumers and decreasing in the number of firms operating. In addition, favorable a priori information about a firm lead...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1058-6407
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12019