Oligopoly limit pricing: Strategic substitutes, strategic complements

Information complements, substitutes, and strategic product design

Strategic Complements, Substitutes, and Ambiguity: The Implications for Public Goods

We examine the e¤ect of ambiguity in symmetric games with aggregate external-ities. We …nd that ambiguity will increase/decrease the equilibrium strategy in games withstrategic complements/substitutes and positive externalities. These e¤ects are reversed ingames with negative externalities. We consider some economic applications of these resultsto Cournot oligopoly, bargaining, ...

A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements: Note

In a 2007 paper, “A global game with strategic substitutes and complements”, by Karp, L., I.H. Lee, and R. Mason, Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 155-175, an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrim in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement and presents an alternative proof for ...

Global Games Selection in Games with Strategic Substitutes or Complements

Global games methods are aimed at resolving issues of multiplicity of equilibria and coordination failure that arise in game theoretic models by relaxing common knowledge assumptions about an underlying parameter. These methods have recently received a lot of attention when the underlying complete information game is one of strategic complements (GSC). Little has been done in this direction con...

Cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes

We conduct a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player games with a Paretoinefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in the case of strategic substitutes.