On chosen target forced prefix preimage resistance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Provable Chosen-Target-Forced-Midfix Preimage Resistance
This paper deals with definitional aspects of the herding attack of Kelsey and Kohno, and investigates the provable security of several hash functions against herding attacks. Firstly, we define the notion of chosen-target-forced-midfix (CTFM) as a generalization of the classical herding (chosen-target-forced-prefix) attack to the cases where the challenge message is not only a prefix but may a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1210-3195
DOI: 10.2478/v10127-010-0034-5