On coalition formation: durable coalition structures
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On coalition formation: durable coalition structures
We define a solution to the problem of coalition formation that applies to purely hedonic games. Coalition structures satisfying our requirements are called durable, and we interpret them as much more likely to last than those coalition structures not satisfying the requirements, which we call transient. Durability results from a combination of foresight and extreme risk aversion on the part of...
متن کاملCorrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203]
In the following we provide corrections of the typographical errors in our article. The definitions of the binary relations ''directly leading'' and ''leading'' should read as follows. 1 A coalition structure 6 on N directly leads to a coalition structure 6 via coalitions T , 1 m T ,. .. ,T 2 m T ,. .. ,T (m $ 1), and we write 6 → 6 9, if h h h 1. T [ 6 9 and T s S(i, 6) for all i [ T and for a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00025-8