On Communication and Collusion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Communication and Collusion∗
We study the role of communication within a cartel. Our analysis is carried out in Stigler’s (1964) model of repeated oligopoly with secret price cuts. Firms observe neither the prices nor the sales of their rivals. For a fixed discount factor, we identify conditions under which there are equilibria with "cheap talk" that result in near-perfect collusion, whereas all equilibria without such com...
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We study the extent to which communication can serve as a collusion device in one-shot firstand second-price sealed-bid auctions. Theoretically, second-price auctions are more fragile to collusion through communication than first-price auctions. In an array of laboratory experiments we vary the amount of interactions (communication and/or transfers without commitment) available to bidders. We f...
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I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidder’s valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. If the probability of the high valuation is sufficiently large and the medium valuation is between one third and one half of the high valuation, th...
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چکیده شخصیت به مجموعه عوامل روانی، عقلی، احساسی، و فیزیکی تشکیل دهنده یک فرد اطلاق میشود، خصوصا فرد ازدیدگاه دیگران ( مرجع). تدابیر یاد گیری سعی در اگاهی از اقدامات زبان اموزان موفق زبان دوم یا یک زبان بیگانه را دارد که توسط خود زبان اموزان گزارش میشود،یا حین یادگیری زبان دوم یا زبان بیگانه از انها قابل مشاهده است( روبین و وندن 1987). همچنین تدابیر ارتباطی به زبان اموزان کمک می کند تا بر مشکلا...
15 صفحه اولStochastic Market Sharing, Partial Communication and Collusion
This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive an imperfect private signal of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic, inter-temporal market sharing as a perfect substitute for communication in low demand states. Therefore, partial communication in high demand states is sufficient t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141469