On ε-equilibrium point in a noncooperative n-person game

Formulating an n-person noncooperative game as a tensor complementarity problem

In this paper, we consider a class of n-person noncooperative games, where the utility function of every player is given by a homogeneous polynomial defined by the payoff tensor of that player, which is a natural extension of the bimatrix game where the utility function of every player is given by a quadratic form defined by the payoff matrix of that player. We will call such a problem the mult...

Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-person Noncooperative Bargaining

Adaptive Noncooperative N -Person Games With Unknown General Quadratic Objectives

Motivated by the problems of unknown objectives in strategic bidding in the restructured electricity power markets where in practice, not all participants have full access to competitors’ information, this paper investigates a class of noncooperative -person games with unknown objectives with linear and cross terms in controls. We first formulate and explicitly derive the Nash equilibrium solut...

Equilibrium Points in N - Person Games

* This note arose from consultations during the tenure of a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship by MacLane. ' Whitehead, J. H. C., "Combinatorial Homotopy I and II," Bull. A.M.S., 55, 214-245 and 453-496 (1949). We refer to these papers as CH I and CH II, respectively. ' By a complex we shall mean a connected CW complex, as defined in §5 of CH I. We do not restrict ourselres to finite com...

Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games.

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