On Games of Perfect Information: Equilibria, E-Equilibria and Approximation by Simple Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Games of Perfect Information: Equilibria, ε-Equilibria and Approximation by Simple Games
We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an ε−perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, and to consider the corresponding sequence of games, each differing form the original game only on the payoff function. In addition, this approach yields a new characterization of p...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.882045