ON GENERALIZED WEIGHT NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR GENERALIZED MULTIOBJECTIVE GAMES
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Generalized Weight Nash Equilibria for Generalized Multiobjective Games
In this paper, we will introduce the general concepts of generalized multiobjective game, generalized weight Nash equilibria and generalized Pareto equilibria. Next using the fixed point theorems due to Idzik [5] and Kim-Tan [6], we shall prove the existence theorems of generalized weight Nash equilibria under general hypotheses. And as applications of generalized weight Nash equilibria, we sha...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the Korean Mathematical Society
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0304-9914
DOI: 10.4134/jkms.2003.40.5.883