On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights representing their entitlements. A natural rule in this setting is maximum weighted Nash welfare (MWNW) rule, which selects an allocation maximizing product agents’ utilities. show that when have binary valuations, a specific version MWNW resource- and population-monotone, satisfies group-strategyproofness, can be implemented polynomial time.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1879-3118', '0165-4896']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.03.004