On Random Sampling Auctions for Digital Goods
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A On Random Sampling Auctions for Digital Goods
In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting random sampling auction has been proposed by Goldberg et al. [2001]. This auction has been analyzed by Feige et al. [2005], who have shown that it obtains in expectation at least 1/15 fraction of the optimal revenue – which is substantially better than the previously proven constant bounds but still far from the conjectured lower boun...
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The emergence of the Internet brings a large change in the economic trend; one such change is the negligible cost of duplicating digital goods. An auction is one of the dynamic selling mechanisms that yields a good result dealing with the case when the consumer utility values are dramatically vary such that it is infeasible to do the market research to determine the best fixed price. In such sc...
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The cost of reproducing a digital good is upper bounded by some low cost, providing the seller with an unlimited supply of items for sale. In such cases, or even in cases that the supply is limited but at least as many as the number of bidders, the agents have no motivation to compete with each other. This lack of competition decreases the total revenue of the seller, making traditional auction...
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Balcan et al. [3] show that the framework of the random sampling auction of Goldberg et al. [12] gives a generic reduction in the context of unlimited supply profit maximization from mechanism design (e.g., Goldberg et al. [12]) to algorithm design (e.g., Guruswami et al. [14]). One major open question left in [3] is to extend the results to limited supply settings. For the case that the seller...
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We consider the case of a digital product with externality, where the product can be sold to multiple buyers who experience some disutility from other firms or consumers owning the same product. We model the problem of selling a digital product with externality as an auction and apply a Bayesian optimal mechanism design. We also design constant-approximation algorithms in the prior-free setting...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2167-8375,2167-8383
DOI: 10.1145/2517148