On the Arrow-Lind theorem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Note on the Arrow-Lind Theorem
Kenneth Arrow and Robert Lind have recently proved a theorem on risky public projects, stating that under certain conditions the social cost of the risk tends to zero as the population tends to infinity, so that projects can be evaluated on the basis of expected net benefit alone. The present note gives an alternative formulation and a short new proof of the theorem, and uses these to examine t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications
سال: 1984
ISSN: 0022-247X
DOI: 10.1016/0022-247x(84)90214-2