On the communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the Communication Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria
We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games, in a setting where players initially know their own payoffs but not the payoffs of the other player. In order for a solution of reasonable quality to be found, some amount of communication needs to take place between the players. We are interested in algorithms where the communication is substantially less than the...
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In view of the intractability of finding a Nash equilibrium, it is important to understand the limits of approximation in this context. A subexponential approximation scheme is known [LMM03], and no approximation better than 1 4 is possible by any algorithm that examines equilibria involving fewer than logn strategies [Alt94]. We give a simple, linear-time algorithm examining just two strategie...
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In this paper we study the complexity of finding approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player normal-form games. First, for any constant number n, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a relative ( 1− 1 1+(n−1)n ) -Nash equilibrium in arbitrary nplayer games and a relative ( 1− 1 1+(n−1)n−1 ) -Nash equilibrium in symmetric n-player games. Next, we show that there is an additive ε-...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.009