On the Equilibrium Uniqueness in Cournot Competition with Demand Uncertainty
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cournot Competition under Uncertainty∗
We analyze Cournot competition under demand uncertainty. We show that under rather general assumptions, the game has no asymmetric equilibria but multiple symmetric equilibria. Multiplicity is caused by the requirement of nonnegative prices and remains an issue also for simple demand specifications, such as the linear case. We then show that uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed if uncertaint...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1935-1704
DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2019-0131