On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design∗
A number of studies, most notably Crémer and McLean (1985, 1988), have shown that in generic type spaces that admit a common prior and are of a fixed finite size, an uninformed seller can design mechanisms that extract all the surplus from privatelyinformed bidders. We show that this result hinges on the non-convexity of such a family of priors. When the ambient family of priors is convex, gene...
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We study the mechanism design problem when the principal can condition the agent’s transfers on the realization of ex post signals that are correlated with the agents’ types. Crémer and McLean (Econometrica, 53(1985) 345-361; 56(1988) 1247-1258), McAfee and Reny (Econometrica, 6(1992) 395-421), Riordan and Sappington (JET, 45(1988) 189-199) studied situations where either the signals are rich e...
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THEOREM 1 Let X and Y be nonempty compact metric spaces. Assume that the topology on M(Y) is induced by a metric that is a convex function onM(Y) ×M(Y). Let E(Xi,M(Y)) be the set of continuous functions b from X toM(Y) that satisfy condition (*), i.e., the requirement that, for any x ∈ X and any μ ∈ M(X), φb(μ) = φb(δx) implies μ = δx, where δx is the degenerate measure that assigns all mass to...
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Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals, or types, of all agents. Previous literature has implicitly assumed that agents cannot observe their payo®s from a decision and has shown that with interdependent valuations and independent signals e±cient design is impossible. This paper shows that if an agent observes his own decision payo®, then it is always possible to ̄nd...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00654.x