On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria
It is well known that the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of an n-player noncooperative game is a convex polytope that includes all the Nash equilibrium distributions. We demonstrate an elementary yet surprising result: the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of the polytope. JEL Classification: C720.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Games Theory
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s001820300162