On the Impossibility of Core-Selecting Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the Impossibility of Core-Selecting Auctions
When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey auction produces efficient, core outcomes that yield competitive seller revenues. In contrast, with complements, the Vickrey outcome, while efficient, is not necessarily in the core and revenue can be very low. Non-core outcomes may be perceived as unfair since there are bidders willing to pay more than the winners’ payments. Moreover, non-core outcomes r...
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Auctions that select core allocations with respect to reported values generate competitive levels of sales revenues at equilibrium and limit bidder incentives to use shills. Among core-selecting auctions, the ones that minimize seller revenues also maximize incentives for truthful reporting, produce the Vickrey outcome when that lies in the core and, in contrast to the Vickrey auction, and crea...
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Recent spectrum auctions in the United Kingdom, and some proposals for future auctions of spectrum in the United States, are based on preliminary price discovery rounds, followed by calculation of final prices for the winning buyers. For example, the prices could be the projection of Vikrey prices onto the core of reported prices. The use of Vikrey prices should lead to more straightforward bid...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1506984