ON THE POWER OF QUANTUM TAMPER-PROOF DEVICES
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the power of quantum tamper-proof devices
We show how quantum tamper-proof devices (QTPD) can be used to attack and to develop security protocols. On one hand, we prove that it is possible to transfer proofs of zero-knowledge protocols using QTPD’s. This attack can be extended to other security schemes where privacy is important. On the other hand, we present a fair contract signing protocol using QTPD’s where there is no communication...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Quantum Information
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0219-7499,1793-6918
DOI: 10.1142/s0219749908003542