On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games
According to Coleman’s index of collective power, a decision rule that generates a larger number of winning coalitions imparts the collectivity a higher a-priori power to act. By the virtue of the monotonicity conditions, a decision rule is totally characterized by the set of minimal winning coalitions. In this paper we investigate the structure of the families of minimal winning coalitions cor...
متن کاملPower Indices and Minimal Winning Coalitions in Simple Games with Externalities
We propose a generalization of simple games to situations with coalitional externalities. The main novelty of our generalization is a monotonicity property that we define for games in partition function form. This property allows us to properly speak about minimal winning embedded coalitions. We propose and characterize two power indices based on these kind of coalitions. We provide methods bas...
متن کاملthe effects of changing roughness on the flow structure in the bends
flow in natural river bends is a complex and turbulent phenomenon which affects the scour and sedimentations and causes an irregular bed topography on the bed. for the reason, the flow hydralics and the parameters which affect the flow to be studied and understand. in this study the effect of bed and wall roughness using the software fluent discussed in a sharp 90-degree flume bend with 40.3cm ...
Power Indices and minimal winning Coalitions
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula how to calculate both indices solely using the set of m...
متن کاملShapley value of simple cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions applied on the real voting data
The main aim of this article is to compare the results of classical Shapley value concept with results of the Shapley value extended to the cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions applied on the real data of the cooperative simple game – in this case the data from the voting in the Lower House of the Czech Parliament 20022012. One of the most intriguing tasks is to describe real system problems...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0408-2