On Value and Obligation in Practical Reason: Toward a Resolution of the Is–Ought Problem in the Thomistic Moral Tradition

On Value and Obligation in Practical Reason:Toward a Resolution of the Is–Ought Problem Thomistic Moral Tradition William Matthew Diem "This brings us to one most pointless controversies modern moral philosophy, … How can we move from descriptive normative, fact value, Is Ought?"1 Introduction Hume's is–ought2 gap is, tradition, regularly treated as being same problem fact–value gap. The transition between two is routinely just swift little-noted that which Scot observed "is" "ought" ethical discourse his own day.3 [End Page 531] Further, these dichotomies (fact–value is–ought) are identical, not only another, but also Aristotle Aquinas's distinction practical speculative.4 And question whether (and if so, how) ("ought" or normative) knowledge derived speculative ("is" descriptive) has driven some fiercest disputes among schools theorists natural law. I intend show both identifications wrong debate been misframed. is–ought gap, neither them corresponds neatly practical. Conflating value obligation resulted an insoluble problem, if, show, they distinct themselves such by Aquinas, then possibility opens resolution—within school—to has, heretofore, proven particularly resistant consensus. My treatment will proceed four sections. first explain defend thesis there gap: bare understanding truth does agent act unless it touches desire inclination. Aquinas well aware this respects purely factual psychology. Second, 532] concepts therefore although—as show—the conflated contemporary dispute over relation knowledge. In third section, clearly distinguishes fact, he recognizes discrete forms reason answer notions, with each form having its set principles. Finally, fourth section that, while conflating led conversely, once notions distinguished, poses no particular difficulty principal concerns sides be answered. With clarifications made, suggest detailed, tentative, account precisely how synderesis gives our awareness law prior understanding. That There Fact–Value Gap By "value" mean name care for thing necessary motivate deliberate activity. Value—considered psychologically sufficient serve motive action—is, at root, function appetite inclination: something it. Since "good" denotes desirable, use language goodness when discussing because analogous term, here danger confusion equivocation, become apparent, averting makes discussion necessary. readily admit senses founded on apprehension thing's teleology. A called good itself, example, complete kind fulfills purpose acts way conducive end...